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1 Introduction
S
tephen Barker (2014) presents a novel approach to solving semantic
paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His
approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His
approach, if successful, renders futile all attempts to assign semantic properties
(truth, falsity, gap or glut) to the paradoxical sentences, whilst leaving classical
logic fully intact. And, according to Barker, even the T-scheme remains valid, for
validity is not undermined by undecidable instances.
Barker’s approach is innovative and worthy of further consideration, particu-
larly by those of us who aim to nd a solution without logical revisionism. As it
stands, however, the approach is unsuccessful, as I shall demonstrate below.
2 Barker’s Account
Barker takes as his starting point a version of the truthmaker principle (2014,
201):
(TM) If a sentence is true (or false), then it is true (or false) in virtue of non-alethic
facts.
A non-alethic fact is something like a state of affairs not involving the properties
truth or falsity: that students drink is one such fact, whereas that the proposition⟨that students drink⟩ is true is not, since the latter involves the property being
true.
Truth or falsity requires a sentence to connect, eventually, to non-alethic facts.
Barker (2014, 202) offers two examples of this connection failing. Consider the
following innite sequence of sentences:
(R1) Sentence R2 is true.
(R2) Sentence R3 is true.
(R3) Sentence R4 is true.⋮
Or, consider the truth-teller sentence:
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(T) Sentence T is true.
In each case, no sentence has the right kind of connection to non-alethic facts.
They are ground-unspeciable (Barker 2014, 203). Notice that there’s nothing
paradoxical about such cases: we can consistently assign them all the value true
or all the value false. But Barker claims, based on (TM), that we should not, for
truth or falsity require the kind of connection to non-alethic reality that’s missing
in each case.
He then argues as follows:
Ground-unspeciable sentences are undecidable with respect to their ground-
ing status. Given TM – which says that all alethic properties must be grounded
– it follows that such sentences are undecidable with respect to their alethic
properties. . . . Call this undecidability with respect to alethic properties alethic-
undecidability or A-undecidability for short. (Barker 2014, 206)
As a consequence, for each example sentence above, it is undecidable whether it
‘is either true or false, lacks truth and falsity, is both true and false, and so on’
(Barker 2014, 206). Alethic undecidability thus implies unassertability: ‘we cannot
assert, in principle, whether they are true, false, either true or false, neither true
nor false, both true and false, and so on’ (Barker 2014, 201).
Barker then applies this reasoning to the (strengthened) Liar sentence:
(L) L is not true;
and to the Curry sentence:
(C) If C is true, then 
(where  is any absurd sentence you like). The claim is that both L and C are
ground-unspeciable, hence A-undecidable. Moreover, according to Barker (2014,
208–9), all attempts at ‘revenge’ fail under this analysis. So, for example:
(R) R is A-undecidable
is ground-unspeciable, hence A-undecidable (Barker 2014, 208). But this result
doesn’t imply that R is true, since for any A-undecidable sentence, we’re banned
from saying whether it ‘is either true or false, lacks truth and falsity, is both true
and false, and so on’ (Barker 2014, 206). That, at least, is Barker’s story.
In this paper, I’ll demonstrate that Barker’s approach is awed. I’ll do so
using only A-decidable reasoning from A-decidable premises. That guarantees
our conclusions will likewise be A-decidable and hence assertable. That’s because
valid reasoning (from nite premises, at least) preserves A-decidability. For if the
premises are A-decidable, then so is their conjunction; and if the reasoning is valid,
then the conditional from the conjoined premises to the conclusion is valid, hence
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A-decidable. Since logical proof is one way to decide the truth of a statement, that
conditional itself must be A-decidable; and a conditional with an A-decidable
antecedent must have an A-decidable consequent. It follows that A-decidable
reasoning from A-decidable premises results in A-decidable conclusions.
My case against Barker is in two steps. First, we can in certain cases establish
(in an A-decidable way) facts about a sentence’s dependencies (§3). I then argue
(§4) that reasoning in this way allows us to reinstate the (strengthened) Liar
paradox.
3 Dependency Graphs
We can establish, in an A-decidable way, certain facts about dependency between
entities, including sentences like L and C. We can use these facts to build directed
dependency graphs for the sentences in question.
The idea is simple: when entity e1 depends on e2, we put an arrow from the
e1 node to the e2 node in our graph. For full generality, we would need to capture
different senses of dependency. (An entity may depend on another for its existence;
but in the case of sentences, we often talk about S1 depending on S2 for its truth.)
We could capture different dependency relations in our graphs with different
colour arrows.
Full generality would also require us to capture the distinction between full
and partial dependency. (A ∧ B) ∨C’s truth depends on the truth of A, B and
C, but in different ways: C is a full ground, whereas A and B are individually
mere partial grounds, but jointly a full ground, for (A ∧ B) ∨C. We can track
the difference using an AND-OR graph structure, familiar from the technical
literature.
We needn’t go into the details here, however, as the cases we’re interested in –
L, C and the Ris – involve simple 1-1 dependencies. Their graphs are as follows:
L C
R1 R2 R3 R4 ⋯
We may interpret an edge A Ð→ B as saying that A’s truth-value depends on B’s
truth-value; or alternatively, as saying that the fact that A depends on (or obtains
in virtue of) the fact that B (obtaining). For our purposes, it doesn’t matter.
Let’s focus on the nite graph for L for the time being. It’s clear that the process
of associating a sentence like L with its graph is algorithmically decidable, given
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the facts (i) that the only referring term in L is ‘L’; and (ii) that ‘L’ refers only to
L. Fact (i) concerns syntax only and so is clearly A-decidable. Fact (ii) is about
reference. It would be absurd to suggest that the reference-facts are A-undecidable
in these cases. For that would imply that we can’t assert that L is self-referential
and hence that the set-up to the paradoxes cannot even be stated. Putting these
points together, the association of L with its graph is A-decidable. (Similarly for C
and its graph.)
Given that these graphs are determinate, nite structures, we can clearly make
determinate statements about them. We can say, for example, that both L’s and C’s
graph consists of a single node and that neither graph has a leaf node. And from
such facts, we can infer further facts about L’s and C’s dependencies: that L does
not depend on C, for example. And crucially, we infer such facts from A-decidable
premises using only A-decidable reasoning, hence our inferred conclusions are
A-decidable.
One class of facts we can determine, using this kind of reasoning, concern
whether given nodes correspond to alethic or to non-alethic facts. Since nodes
are sentences, this amounts to a syntactic check for the predicates ‘is true’ and
‘is false’. Clearly, that check is A-decidable. (And even if we thought the class of
alethic predicates was open-ended, or otherwise A-undecidable, it’s clear that ‘is
true’ and ‘is false’ are alethic predicates. So we clearly have a sufcient condition
for a node’s representing an alethic fact.) This allows us to infer, A-decidably, that
L’s graph’s sole node states an alethic fact and hence that no node in the graph
states a non-alethic fact. Such inferences will be crucial in the argument below.
It isn’t so clear whether this kind of reasoning applies to the innite graph
associated with R1. It isn’t in general algorithmically decidable whether such
graphs contain such-and-such nodes. (A tree automaton search for such nodes
may never terminate.) But now consider how the regress case is presented. We
give its rst few cases, R1, R2, R3 explicitly; and then we say ‘. . .’ or ‘and so on’.
By this, we mean to say that the case consists of innitely many sentences, one for
each n ∈ N, of the form:
(Rn) Sentence Rn+1 is true.
If that is the implicit content of the specication of the case, then we have a
general premise from which to reason. We infer that each Rn depends only on
Rn+1 and that there is no last Rn. From this, it follows mathematically (and
hence A-decidably) that R1’s graph has certain features: in particular, that each
node states an alethic condition and hence that there is no branch in the graph
terminating in a non-alethic node. This kind of reasoning allows us to reason
about innite cases, including Yablo’s paradox.
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4 The Problem
The worry for Barker’s proposal goes like this. L’s graph contains no non-alethic
nodes. All its nodes are alethic nodes, expressing alethic facts. So L’s dependencies
involve only alethic facts. But by (TM), no alethic fact grounds any sentence’s
truth. So L has no alethic ground. It is ungrounded. So by (TM), it is not true.
This conclusion was inferred from A-decidable premises using only A-decidable
reasoning and so it A-decidable that L is not true. We can then reason (A-decidably)
in the usual way to a contradiction.
Barker (2014, 4–5) considers a related argument along these lines and argues
that it does not work: ‘to infer . . . that [L] is ungrounded from that fact is to forget
the innite deferment of grounding’ (Barker 2014, 5), involving ‘an innite series
of interpretative stages’ (Barker 2014, 6). In the analogous case of the truth-teller,
T, he argues that
. . . at each stage, no grounding condition is specied. But there is always a
further interpretative stage after any given stage. . . . Since T at no stage can
be held up as the source of T’s failing to be grounded, we cannot say that T is
ungrounded on the basis that no sentence at any interpretive stage describes a
non-alethic condition. (Barker 2014, 6)
Barker’s reasoning here is faulty. We can infer general conclusions about T’s
dependencies. The reasoning via T’s graph allows us to infer (A-decidably) that
no node in T’s graph states a non-alethic condition and hence (A-decidably) that
T does not depend on any non-alethic fact. We don’t need to enter into Barker’s
innite sequence of interpretive stages: we need only the premises that (i) ‘T’ refers
(only) to T and (ii) T contains ‘is true’ and hence states an alethic fact. That is
sufcient information to build the dependency graph and conclude that T does
not depend on any non-alethic fact and hence is ungrounded.
Exactly the same goes for L and C, with the usual paradoxical consequences.
Given that (i) ‘L’ refers (only) to L and (ii) L contains ‘is true’ and hence states an
alethic fact, we can build L’s dependency graph and determine, A-decidably, that it
contains only alethic nodes. So, A-decidably, L is not grounded by any non-alethic
fact and hence, by (TM), is not true. It is A-decidable that L is not true. (Exactly
the same reasoning applies to C.) Then L is assertible and apt for inclusion in
standard logical reasoning. But that reasoning quickly leads to absurdity: we can
assert the Liar equivalence (L is true iff it is not true), from which it follows that
L is both true and not true. The paradox has not been blocked.
5 Conclusion
I’ve argued that we can, in certain cases, draw clear, A-decidable conclusions
about a sentence’s alethic dependencies. From clear facts about a sentence’s syntax
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and reference of its terms, we can build dependency graphs (§3) and reason about
a sentence’s dependencies. In particular, we can determine, A-decidably, that L is
ungrounded, hence not true; but this quickly results in absurdity. So, A-decidably,
we must reject Barker’s proposal.
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